Spotlight

New Delhi, 18 June 2026

The Iran War

SOUTHEAST ASIA HIT HARD

By Barbara Kratiuk

(Expert, Centre For Intl Relations, Poland) 

For Southeast Asia, which consumes the lion’s share of oil and LNG flowing from the Persian Gulf, the shock caused by the closure of Strait of Hormuz was almost immediate and exceptionally severe. Apart from the parties to the conflict themselves, no other region felt the impact of the blockade so acutely. 

In 2024, 84% of crude oil and 83% of LNG transported through the Strait was destined for Asian markets; nearly all ASEAN nations are net energy importers with dangerously low strategic reserves. Most members hold stocks sufficient for less than 30 days—with Philippines holding about 45 days’ worth and Thailand a nominal 106—figures that pale in comparison to Japan’s 254-day supply, South Korea’s 208 supply, and China’s 120 supply. 

The economic damage is extensive: fuel prices at pumps are rising at double-digit rates, budget deficits are ballooning under weight of fuel subsidies, industrial supply chains are collapsing, currencies are depreciating, and GDP forecasts are being drastically downgraded. The political response was intense and varied, revealing strategic capabilities—or lack thereof—of individual nations. 

Impact on ASEAN countries

The Philippines was the hardest-hit economy in the bloc. Importing 98% of its oil from Middle East, Manila was the quickest and most vocal in its response. Diesel prices hit 130 Philippine pesos per litre, while gasoline exceeded 100 pesos. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. became the first leader globally to declare a state of energy emergency under Decree No. 110, launching the government’s “UPLIFT” programme.Consequently, the IMF downgraded the Philippines’ 2026 economic growth forecast from 5.6% to 4.1%—one of the sharpest revisions in Asia. 

Vietnam is one of the most structurally vulnerable nations in the region. Approximately 85% of its oil imports originate in Middle East, with virtually all of it coming from a single source: Kuwait. Pump prices rose by about 19% despite tax relief measures; fuel queues and panic buying became a daily occurrence. MUFG Research warns if the price of Brent crude remains around $120 per barrel, Vietnam’s GDP growth could fall by over one percentage point—potentially dropping below 7%—and USD/VND exchange rate could exceed 27,000. Hanoi has announced plans to source four million barrels from suppliers outside Middle East, but this amounts to “just six days of consumption.” 

Despite being a producer, Indonesia imports over a third of its oil. Its fuel subsidy budget for 2026—set at IDR 381.3 trillion ($22.3 billion)—was based on an oil price of $70 per barrel and an exchange rate of IDR 16,500. Both assumptions are now outdated. Jakarta has introduced fuel purchase limits via the digital MyPertamina QR system, capping consumption at 200 litres per vehicle per day while keeping subsidised prices unchanged. 

However, Malaysia, the only net energy exporter in ASEAN, finds itself in a difficult position: 38% of its oil flows through Strait of Malacca, and it imports refined products. Financial cost of capping the price of RON95 gasoline at RM1.99 per litre is immense—monthly subsidies surged from RM700 million before the crisis to RM7 billion in April, and the projected annual subsidy cost stands at RM58.4 billion, compared to the RM15 billion originally budgeted. 

Thailand, a regional refining hub, saw its Oil Fuel Fund swing from a surplus of 2.5 billion THB on March 1 to a deficit of 62.4 billion THB by April 26—a shift of nearly 2 billion USD in just eight weeks. Singapore, where gas accounted for 93.1% of the fuel mix in 2025, felt the impact quietly but severely. 

Smaller economies suffered too. In Laos, long queues for fuel formed in Vientiane; Myanmar implemented an alternating-day driving system; Cambodia is almost entirely dependent on imports from Thailand—supplies that Bangkok had restricted. 

Varied Responses

The earliest, least costly, and most visible policy response was to curb demand by altering work patterns. The Philippines introduced a four-day workweek for government offices; Indonesia allowed civil servants to work from home one day a week; Thailand asked citizens to “ditch their jackets” to reduce reliance on air conditioning; Vietnamurged employers to enable remote work wherever possible to reduce transport demand; Malaysia cancelled government-sponsored Hari Raya open houses, restricted official overseas travel, and discussed work-from-home; Myanmar introduced alternating driving days. 

The next step was physical fuel rationing. Indonesia implemented 200-litre limit. Thailand imposed ban on export of refined products, with some exceptions. It launched investigations into alleged oil stockpiling in the southern part and resale to neighbouring countries. In contrast, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmarresorted to rationing via queues. 

Almost every ASEAN government has resorted to extraordinary price interventionsand is paying a heavy fiscal price. Vietnam has suspended environmental taxes and VAT on gasoline and diesel and is drawing on its Fuel Stabilisation Fund, which holds only 15–30 days of reserves. Indonesia is operating with a subsidy budget based on oil price over $30 below current market levels. Thailand’s Oil Fuel Fund has swung from surplus to deep deficit. Subsidy costs in Malaysia are roughly 10 times higher than pre-crisis levels, forcing government to eliminate subsidies for higher-income earners—a measure every Malaysian government has discussed for a decade but avoided implementing. 

A long-delayed reform

The crisis has exposed the most significant structural flaw in regional energy security: near-total absence of substantial strategic oil reserves. The Philippines has proposed increasing statutory oil stockpiles from 15 to 30 days and LPG reserves from 7 to 21. Despite being a producer, Malaysia lacks formal strategic reserves. Thailand, holding largest nominal reserves at 106 days, has stocks sufficient for just 38 days. Vietnam’s reserves are estimated at less than 20 days. Indonesia has launched energy projects worth IDR 116 trillion. 

Shift towards Russia

The most strategically significant moves have occurred on supply side and a shift towards Russia. Indonesian President Prabowo undertook a4-country tour (Japan, South Korea, Russia, and France) recently. In Japan, business agreements worth USD23.6 billion were concluded; in Seoul bilateral relations turned into comprehensive strategic partnership. Moscow visit resulted in long-term agreements for supply of crude oil and LPG, with Russia proposing an “increase to Indonesian markets.” Vietnam and Malaysia are considering importing Russian crude oil following easing of US sanctions. 

Malaysia took an even riskier diplomatic step: Anwar established direct contact with Tehran, speaking to President Masoud Pezeshkian for safe passage of seven tankers. Said he: “Malaysia’s diplomatic relations with Iran are based not only on humanitarianism and solidarity in face of Israeli attacks but also serve our country's energy security.”Philippines too established direct contact with Tehran. 

Joint Response

Coordination at bloc level has long relied primarily on rhetoric, lacking operational solidarity. For first time in over a decade, ASEAN is reactivating the long-dormant 2009 ASEAN Petroleum Security Agreement, promoting ASEAN Power Grid project, and discussing joint procurement of oil from sources outside Middle East. Efforts to achieve a 45% share of renewable energy in the region by 2030 are being accelerated. 

ASEAN’s hallmark principles of non-interference and consensus-based decision-making hinder its ability to respond effectively to crises. There is no equivalent to IEA’s collective stock-release mechanism, no shared reserves, and no enforcement capabilities. Whether they seizethis opportunity or simply patch up the damage and revert to dependency once the Strait reopens will determine ASEAN’s energy security for a generation.---INFA 

(Copyright, India News & Feature Alliance)

Open Forum

New Delhi, 17 June 2026

Resilience In Energy

GOVT MUST EXPLORE OPTIONS

By Dhurjati Mukherjee 

At a time when energy security has become a top priority for countries across the world, including India, building long-term resilience against geopolitical risks requires a fundamental shift in the composition of the energy sector. In India’s case, there has been considerable neglect in the exploration and development of domestic oil and gas resources. Equally significant has been the slow pace of electrification and the inadequate expansion of clean-energy infrastructure that could have reduced dependence on fossil fuels. 

Although large-scale solar and wind energy projects have been successfully implemented in states such as Gujarat and Rajasthan, along with several others, investments in transmission infrastructure have not kept pace with generation capacity. As a result, many states continue to face transmission bottlenecks, limiting the efficient distribution and utilisation of renewable energy. Addressing these gaps will be crucial if India is to achieve greater energy security, accelerate its transition to cleaner sources of power, and withstand future external shocks. 

A major milestone is the very recent discovery of natural gas in the Andaman Sea by Oil India which is expected to be a game-changer in reducing the country’s high reliance on imported energy. It is understood that the well sits in 355 metres of water. During production testing in the Eocene formation at a depth of 1900 metres, continuous gas firing and pressure built-up were observed. Out of the three wells drilled so far, two have successfully confirmed the presence of hydrocarbons. 

Meanwhile, Union Petroleum Minister HardeepPurirecently stated as India imported 80 percent of oil and 50 percent of gas, with the East Andaman Sea discovery, things are destined to change. He further pointed out that India holds the potential of ‘several Guyana’s’ in the Andaman region and outlined several measures taken by the government for exploration and production. Further he observed the country was 3.5 million square kilometres of sedimentary basin but it never explored beyond 8 percent area, keeping a large expanse of sea beds unexplored. 

The other important aspect is that of electrification of the transport sector. Electric cars, buses and trucks are cheaper to run and greatly reduce pollution in cities and urban areas. China is leading the world in electric cars and battery storage, yet, we have rejected proposals from BYD, the world’s biggest electric auto producer and second biggest battery producer, when it proposed a billion-dollar investment. It is time for India to take steps in this direction to reduce pollution. 

Since 40 percent of EV’s price comes down to its battery, lighter cars with smaller batteries are the answer. A rapidly expanding public charging network can address range anxiety. Battery-as-a-service or Naas, model in which you pay a monthly subscription for the battery, also lowers initial price. But while India taxes EVs at 5 percent, BaaS is taxed at 18 percent,and this must change. 

The NitiAayog recommended concentration on specific regions, say the metros, first. For network effects this is a good idea because big cities need air quality improvements urgently. Switching to electric cooking should be easier because equipment costs are lower. And the energy savings are enormous because induction plates and microwave ovens, for example, don’t waste fuel heating ambient air and vessels. 

As for biofuels when the country is plagued by the West Asian crisis, experts call for need to shift using the biofuel mission from food crops to produce ethanol to using crop residue. Fertilisers, the main chemical urea for food crops, are mostly imported. Thus, the solution lies in biofuels. Waste-based biofuels kill two birds with one stone, --biorefinery – they produce fuel (ethanol) and can replace imported chemical fertilisers (urea) with organic fertilisers at the farm level. 

It is encouraging to note that the recent announcement of central excise exemption for petrol laced with 20-30 percent ethanol follows recently announced standards for various grades in this band. The tax exemption ought to facilitate higher levels of ethanol blending. As per a study, the increase in ethanol blending by around 13-fold from 1.5 percent in 2014 to 20 percent in 2025 saved the government around 1.06 trillion rupees in crude oil imports and avoided 54.4 million tonnes of carbon emissions in a decade. 

If India were to meaningfully move away from food crops to crop residue like cane stubble and bagasse, rice and wheat straw, corn cobs etc. it will have a multiplier effect. Processing from residue nothing goes to waste as India generates around 500 million tonnes of agricultural residue every year, that could, as per estimates, yield 40 litres of ethanol-equivalent. Biogas slurry –the waste after producing biogas – is excellent organic fertiliser. This, in turn, will help slash the government’s crippling fertiliser subsidy bill, estimated at a staggering Rs 2.4 litres crore this year, and free farmers from imported chemical fertilisers that kill soil nutrients.  There is imperative need to consider this aspect for greater gains in the long-term. 

In the nuclear sector, a milestone was achieved in April when a prototype fast-breeder reactor (PFBR) at Kalpakkam attained criticality. Developed indigenously by BharatiyaNabhikiyaVidyut Nigam (BHA-VINI), the 500 Mwe reactor marks India’s formal entry into the second stage of its 3-stage nuclear programme. Apart from this, a welcome development is the government’s decision to consider measures that include assured power purchase agreements (PPAs) to attract private sector investments in the nuclear sector. 

As the country has limited supply of uranium, the 3-state programme was conceived to enable large-scale utilisation of thorium, which is abundant for power generation. Meanwhile Bhabha Atomic Research Station (BARC) is understood to be developing several advanced reactor designs, including 200 MWe Bharat Small Modular Reactor (BSMT-200). 55SMeSMR-55and a high temperature gas-cooled reactor intended for hydrogen production. In coming years nuclear energy may help the cause of energy resilience and play a larger role in this sector. Experts are of the view, and quite rightly, that the combined efforts of renewable energy as well as nuclear programmes could help India’s huge energy requirement. 

One may refer to a study in November 2025 by the Council on Energy, Environment and Water estimated that India’s green economy could attract $1 trillion investment and create 48 million jobs. For energy security, scaling biofuels and renewable powered mobility can displace crude oil imports, unlocking #3.6 trillion opportunities. For food and materials, bioeconomy can harness India’s 700 million tonnes of biomass, the largest in the world, to reduce fertiliser imports while the present findings of gas in the Andaman Sea augurs well for the country. ---INFA

(Copyright, India News & Feature Alliance)

Political Diary

New Delhi, June 16 2026

Greed For Power

IDEOLOGY OF POLITICS

 By Poonam I Kaushish 

Nothing costs a nation more than a cheap politician. This lexicon holds true in the political season of swapping lovers. Whereby, it’s difficult to keep tabs on whose sleeping with whom, who’s jumping into which bed, eloping with whom, tying the nuptial knot and divorcing whom. Who’s in, who’s out, who’s entering which door and cutting which deals --- sideways and under. Who’s cutting corners or double-crossing whom? Who’s back-stabbing who, as friends and enemies are all rolled into one in this constant eddy of defections. All, for Power. 

An issue which haunts Mamata’s TMC which has lost 20 MPs to ‘unknown’ Tripura regional outfit Nationalist Citizens Party along-with 59 MLAs earlier. Ditto Kejriwal’s AAP who’s seven MPs crossed to BJP as had Thackeray’s Shiv Sena and Pawar’s NCP to form a coalition Government in Maharashtra.

Confided a defected TMC leader, “With BJP emerging as the dominant State and national political force, we found ourselves under pressure from a large, more resourceful opponent who could arm-twist us. So the challenge was no longer merely about staying relevant but survival, hence we defected.”

Arguably, what is the purpose of a Party? To preserve its identity, conserve ideology it was created to serve? Remain relevant in a steadily shrinking political space? Massaging egos? Or is winning and being in power, the be-all-and- end- all of politics?

Undoubtedly, when power is the goal of politics, ideology has no leg to stand on. The reality of   today’s practical politics. Power is the means through which Parties implement policies. Without power, ideology remains just a set of ideas. But when pursuit of power becomes the overriding objective, ideology becomes secondary, flexible or even disposable.

Obversely, defenders of political pragmatism argue that ideological purity without power accomplishes little. Compromises, alliances, and tactical shifts are necessary to win elections and govern. Consequently, power matters.

Raising a moot point: How much ideological compromise is acceptable in the pursuit of power? What’s the relationship between MPs-MLAs and his constituents? Are they just representatives or is there a deeper moral bond, now forgotten?

Think. When leaders campaign they present a certain image of themselves, subscribing to certain beliefs, promise to do certain things and commit themselves to function within confines of loyalty to the Party they belong to. It is on this basis they get votes. So when they defect is it not a breach of the terms on which they sought a ticket and fought elections? Is it not a betrayal to their Party and voter? Why did they choose to rebel when their Party was defeated? Why not earlier? Would they have rebelled if the Party had won?

Underscoring, individual meanness, opportunism and a share of the power pie is the glue that keeps all together. Indeed, power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely, morality be damned. Confided a leader, “Hum sab ek hi thaali ke chate-bate hain aur is maryada ke hamam mein nagain hai!”  

Succinctly, these paper tigers who sell their political soul to the highest bidder in this political nautanki are dubbed smart. Whereby, every Party and its leaders have perfected the art of beguiling its hum zulfs and dushmans with aplomb, saddling us with opportunists and liars. Exposing the disdain with which our netagan holds democracy and voters.

Thereby, exposing politics of the worst kind, cultivating low morality and high greed --- and need of the hour. A power-play when personality-oriented malicious vilification seems to have became the hallmark of democracy. Sans shared ideology and mutual objectives. This pithily is aaj ki rajneeti.

Sadly, our leaders credibility has hit rock bottom. The greed for power is overpowering. Politicians invoke ideology while in Opposition but seem willing to set it aside when power is at stake. That gap between rhetoric and behavior is what leads to the conclusion that power is the real ideology of politics.

Said a senior leader, “Ideology gains supporters and gets Parties elected; power keeps us alive and allows us to implement anything at all. Without power, ideology remains only a slogan. Hence, power becomes the sole goal.” Big deal, if Parties eventually lose credibility and become indistinguishable from one another.

Can we merely shrug our shoulders and dismiss it as political kalyug? If one accepts the premise that power politics has overshadowed ideology, then the way forward is not necessarily to abandon politics, but to reconnect power with purpose Parties must define non-negotiable principles. They can compromise on tactics, alliances, and policies, but there should be core values that cannot be traded away.

A Party ideally exists to advance a set of ideas, policies, and interests — not merely to preserve its own organizational existence. In theory, the Party is a vehicle for an ideology or a political vision. In practice, however, Parties often face a tension between two goals: Preserving ideology and staying true to principles on which Party was founded, even if that costs votes, power, or members. Or preserving the organization – adapting, compromising or changing positions to remain electorally viable and keep Party alive.

When voters conclude that there is no limit to that compromise, trust in Parties and politicians tends to decline. When Parties refuse all compromise, they may remain principled but struggle to influence policy. Democratic politics is often a constant balancing act between those two extremes.

The practical way forward is for Parties to decide whether it is primarily: a movement built around an idea, a vehicle built around a leader or an electoral machine focused on winning power. The more clearly a Party answers this, the more likely it will survive periods of turmoil. Parties that know what they stand for can lose leaders and still endure. Parties that stand only for power often find it harder to retain loyalty once power begins to ebb.

However, saying ideology is completely irrelevant may go too far. Ideology still influences Indian politics in important ways: BJP has built much of its appeal around nationalism, cultural identity and governance themes. CPM continue to be guided by a distinct ideological framework even when electorally weak. Regional parties often champion federalism, linguistic identity, or regional interests. Voters themselves frequently make choices based on values, identity, and policy preferences, not just patronage.

Certainly, a course correction is possible. This depends whether voters, civil society groups, courts and leaders demand it at the same time. Without sustained public pressure, politics tends to drift toward what wins elections rather than what best reflects ideology. Till such time, power is the operational ideology of much of politics, regardless of what Parties claim publicly.

India today is at the moral crossroads. In this game of lies, deceit and deception, BJP, Congress and regional outfits reflect the emerging truth of today’s India. Power is all. 

But, for voters it raises a serious concern: If leaders can move across political lines with ease while claiming a moral high ground, then what are we voting for? A belief system? Or a moment in a larger negotiation of power? What ideology? What principles? Or does the wind simply tells us which way to blow. What gives? ---- INFA 

(Copyright, India News & Feature Alliance)

Spotlight

New Delhi, 13 June 2026 

Impact of War in Iran for Japan

By Beata Bochorodycz

(Expert, Centre For Intl Relations, Poland) 

The war in Iran, despite considerable geographical distance, is causing multidimensional effects in Japan, not only economic issues, energy security and supply chains, but also its foreign and defence policy and public debate.Japan, as a country strongly dependent on the stability of Middle East, is closely monitoring the conflict, but is also redefining its own strategic priorities. 

The largest and most direct consequence is the threat to its energy security. Japan is one of the countries’ most dependent on energy imports in the world. About 95% of oil and 11% of LNG imports come from Middle East. Although Iran is not a major supplier, the stability of region, including Strait of Hormuz, is crucial for Japanese economy, as most oil and gas flows through it. The closure of the strait resulted in a 95% drop in oil flows and a 99% drop in LNG flows in the two months since the conflict began. With a complete blockade and no alternative supply routes, Japan’s strategic oil reserves will last for 254 days. 

The increase in oil prices translates into an increase in energy prices. According to World Bank, energy prices may increase globally by 24% in 2026. Japan, as an economy strongly integrated with global markets, feels the effects, especially in energy-intensive sectors (chemistry, steel, transport). The increase in such prices translated into higher production costs, transport prices, food and consumer goods. The Bank of Japan, which had just started the process of stabilising monetary policy, faced a difficult choice between fighting imported inflation and supporting economic growth. The increase also had an impact on household portfolios. 

The government has introduced subsidies to protect citizens from the rising cost of living and is now considering extending subsidy from June-September, when people use it the most. The cost of such actions is estimated at 500 billion yen. With a prolonged conflict, continuing such support may become difficult given the very high debt of the treasury. The country is additionally exposed to a high risk due to the weakening yen. 

Furthermore, supply chains have been disrupted. Although Japan is not directly dependent on Iran for industrial raw materials, global prices for metals and chemicals, availability of petrochemical components, and stability of maritime transport are affected. Japanese companies—particularly in automotive and electronics sectors—are forced to increase inventories and diversify suppliers. Even under the optimistic scenario outlined by the Nomura Research Institute, production volumes are expected to continue falling and GDP to contract. As a net importer, Japan has felt the impact sooner than most OECD nations. 

On the other hand, the war is accelerating diversification of energy sources. This has been a topic of discussion since at least the oil crisis of 1970s, which first made its people acutely aware of the consequences of relying on a single region. The current conflict is also acting as a catalyst for “green transformation” policies and investments in nuclear energy.  

Tokyo has stepped up efforts to increase the share of renewable energy, but, crucially, and despite earlier public opposition, it’s accelerating the restart of nuclear power plants (sometimes at the expense of renewables). The war has reminded Japan its energy security is structurally dependent on a region that remains one of the most unstable in the world. 

Diplomatic Consequences

The diplomatic consequences are equally complex. It must be emphasised that for decades, Tokyo’s Middle East policy is largely independent of Washington, characterised by a balanced approach to engagement. It has traditionally acted as a mediator, maintaining good relations with both Gulf states and Iran while avoiding taking a definitive side in conflicts. This war has disrupted the balance. Deepening polarisation has forced Tokyo to be more cautious in its choice of partners to avoid facing economic or political repercussions. 

Furthermore, since this conflict, the US has intensified pressure on Japan, expecting greater military and logistical support—particularly regarding protection of maritime routes and stabilisation coalitions. While discussions and questions have arisen in Japan concerning potential involvement in US operations, there have been no government decisions or even declarations indicating any concessions to Washington. 

Notably, despite US pressure, Sanae Takaichi’s government has not openly supported either US or Israel. The Prime Minister’s response remains restrained, cautious, and devoid of unequivocal statements. Takaichi reiterated the general stance on the need to prevent nuclear proliferation. The government focused its efforts on evacuating citizens and monitoring energy situation, demonstrating safety of Japanese nationals in the region and stability of oil and LNG supplies. 

Tokyo is also avoiding any assessment of legality of bombing of Iran—unlike its response to Russia’s 2022 attack on Ukraine, when it firmly and unequivocally condemned Moscow’s actions as violation of international law. The current war has forced Tokyo to strike an even more delicate balance between alliance solidarity and its own energy interests. 

Security Consequences

The conflict is also significantly influencing reforms in realm of security and defence policy. It fits into a broader trend of global and regional threats—such as China’s assertiveness, North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, and Russian revisionism—that have for several years driven Japan’s defence reforms toward the country’s “normalization,” entailing a revision of constitutional military constraints and strengthening of its own military capabilities. 

Takaichi is fulfilling her campaign promises regarding security. Intensive work is underway on both the constitutional revision and key strategic documents—including the National Security Strategy—to be completed this December. There should be an expansion of roles and mandates of Self-Defence Force units, particularly Maritime Self-Defence Force (MSDF), regarding participation in international operations, including protection of sea lanes. 

Furthermore, the premise that deterrence capabilities must be strengthened is being reaffirmed; this entails continued development of counterstrike capabilities and industrial-technological innovation in areas such as AI, cyber capabilities, quantum systems, space infrastructure, and autonomous platforms, alongside strengthened cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners. 

The war diverts US attention away from Asia, signalling to Tokyo it must expand cooperation with other regional states—including Australia, South Korea, India, and ASEAN nations—as well as foster trans-regional relationships, such as with NATO. The conflict is thus acting as a catalyst for expanding Japan’s “strategic autonomy” within the framework of Japan-US alliance, and for fostering intra-and inter-regional security integration with “like-minded partners.” This integration is not intended to exclude US, but to provide a safeguard against a scenario where America might be unable or unwilling to support its Asian allies. 

Socio-Political Consequences

The least obvious consequences of the war are socio-political in nature—specifically, the way the conflict shapes public debate and domestic policy. The war has reignited discussions regarding Japan’s global role. Experiences from war in Asia and Pacific, combined with constitutional constraints on Japan’s military activities and combat capabilities, have fostered a strong pacifist identity and an anti-militarist culture. 

Japanese society, traditionally skeptical of involvement in foreign conflicts, is once again grappling with questions concerning the scope of alliance obligations, limits on use of Self-Defence Forces, and Japan’s responsibility for international peace and order. Since outbreak of war in Ukraine, calls for strategic military autonomy vis-à-vis US, strengthening of domestic military capabilities, and diversification of strategic partners are gaining momentum. The war is thus influencing ongoing redefinition of Japanese pacifist identity and emerging as a key test of Japan’s resilience and adaptability in an era of global instability.---INFA 

(Copyright, India News & Feature Alliance)