Political Diary                                                                                                                 

New Delhi, 21 July 2026

J&K Statehood

PERPETUAL HALFWAY HOUSE?

 By Poonam I Kaushish 

It’s the busy season of protest and all roads lead to Parliament as it began its monsoon session yesterday. A mammoth crowd of over 20,000 students gathered to storm our temple of democracy demanding Education Minister’s resignation over the NEET paper leak.  Lost in their din, but equally significant was Abdullah’s ruling National Conference (NC) insistent on restoration of Statehood to Jammu & Kashmir and telling the Modi Government to honour its commitment made in Parliament and Supreme Court. 

Specially, post Article 370’s removal 2019, peaceful elections 2024 which broke a long political standstill, with BJP habitually flaunting drop in insurgency and tourism booming as evidence of return of normalcy in “Naya Kashmir”. Resulting in increasing frustration in NC with Chief Minister Omar Abdullah facetious remark, political clickbait, “Let BJP tell us whether we have to go to US President Trump for statehood and hold dharna outside White House.”

Questionably, if Kashmir today is “normal enough” for full democratic self-Government what is the hitch? What benchmark remains unmet?

Succinctly, the biggest obstacle is not Constitutional. It is political and strategic. The Government has repeatedly said Statehood will be restored “at an appropriate time.” The debate is over when and under what conditions.

The Centre reluctance is primarily security concerns as though security has improved it remains fragile and Statehood would follow only after those gains are firmly consolidated. Given the State has faced decades of militancy, cross-border infiltration and Pakistan sponsored terrorism. The wounds of the horrific attack in Pahalgam are still fresh.

There is also an electoral dimension. A Union Territory gives Centre greater administrative influence vis-à-vis an independent State Government, particularly if led by Parties frequently opposed to New Delhi could become a powerful political counterweight. Further, direct control through the LG allows faster security decisions and closer coordination between army, paramilitary forces, intelligence agencies and police.  

Said a senior leader, “The State Government might have priorities which occasionally conflict with New Delhi’s security strategies. Not by supporting militancy but by taking a different political approach. Besides, post Article 370 abrogation the Centre doesn’t want sustained political confrontation from regional Parties Abdullah’s NC and Mufti’s PDP.”

More. Why give up powers that help maintain stability and curb separatist politics? BJP values control more than the symbolism of keeping the timeline open. A Union Territory status gives the Centre significantly greater influence over administration through the LG. Restoring Statehood would mean sharing power with an elected Government that could disagree with Delhi on governance, policing priorities or the political narrative around Kashmir. Retaining control has practical advantages for the Centre. Restoring Statehood would mean surrendering some of that control.

Also, the Saffron Sangh’s political incentives do not strongly favor restoring Statehood. There is no clear electoral penalty for delaying it. For many BJP’s supporters outside J&K, Article 370’s repeal was the defining issue, not the timing of Statehood. In contrast, if the State Government becomes a vocal critic of New Delhi or if security deteriorates the political costs for the Party and Central Government could be substantial.

Additionally, even though security has improved, policymakers believe they need several more years of sustained stability before changing the governance structure. They want to judge how durable those gains are.

On the other hand, for the State Government Statehood is not just a symbolic issue as it determines who ultimately exercises political power, money and control over administration. As things stand today, real power still lies with New Delhi. Crucial subjects like law and order, police and public administration are under control of the LG.

Kashmiri leaders argue they are accountable to voters but do not possess the authority normally enjoyed by the State Government. Abdullah’s NC campaigned heavily on restoring Statehood during elections. If they fail, rival PDP accuses them of being powerless and the Centre’s stooge. A majority of Kashmiris view abrogation as downgrading their political status. For them Statehood is seen as the minimum restoration of dignity and political agency.  

One of the biggest complaints, of the Abdullah-led Government is that bureaucrats often look upward to the LG and Union Home Ministry and downward to elected Ministers. Statehood would strengthen Ministerial authority over the administrative machinery.

Obversely, delaying Statehood becomes increasingly difficult to justify in democratic terms as an elected Government is in place and there is democratic representation. Both positions involve trade-offs. The first prioritizes security and centralized control and the second federalism. The disagreement is less about the legal possibility of Statehood and more about how much risk the Centre is willing to accept and when it judges that risk to have become acceptable. 

More important, there is mistrust on both sides. Successive Central Governments be it Congress or BJP have often viewed Kashmir’s politicians as unreliable, accusing sections of encouraging separatist sentiment while benefiting from democracy. Kashmiri politicos accuse Delhi of repeatedly undermining elected Governments through dismissals, Governor’s rule and political interference.

Perhaps, BJP has a low appetite for risk as it views the stakes as unusually high and is exercising strategic caution in a uniquely sensitive region. One, a hostile State Government could become a persistent political challenge. Two, another major terror attack like Pahalgam, after Statehood could be described as evidence New Delhi “relaxed” too soon. Three, if unrest increases, the Government would have bear the political cost of having restored Statehood.

Critics aver, if the Government consistently argues elections have been held, Kashmir is more peaceful, investment is rising, there are many infrastructure projects and integration has succeeded then repeatedly postponing Statehood appears inconsistent with that narrative. The delay suggests the Centre itself lacks full confidence in the durability of the post-2019 settlement hence it is avoiding political risk and retaining administrative control for as long as possible.

Clearly, “appropriate time” has become an open-ended political commitment rather than a commitment tied to transparent, measurable criteria. It depends on how one weighs the remaining security risks against the democratic case for restoring full Statehood.

In the ultimate, sans the political rhetoric and Constitution jargon of Centre-State tussle, the fundamental tension boils down to who wields power:  Centre or Srinagar’s elected Government. Centre says it brought stability, State counters without democratic authority is incomplete victory. Either which way, democratic credibility depends not merely on holding elections but also ensuring genuine executive authority.

A perpetual halfway house is unlikely to satisfy either democratic aspirations or long term political stability. All sides should prepare a transparent and objective roadmap based on security, governance and institutional stability rather than political convenience to reconcile democratic aspirations with national security. What gives?

(Copyright India News & Feature Alliance)

Spotlight

New Delhi, 18 July 2026

India’s Foreign Policy

FACES A DIFFICULT TEST

By Dr. Tomasz Gerlach

(Expert, Centre for Intl Relations, Poland) 

As a result of the war in Iran and the potential for a broader conflict in West Asian region, India's multi-vector foreign policy, which focuses on expanding its presence in East Asia and developing good neighbourly relations, and ultimately on becoming a global player, is being put to a difficult test. Prime Minister Modi’s unequivocal support for Israel’s approach to Palestinian issue and its policy towards Iran could bring unpleasant consequences for Delhi. 

While Modi’s visit to Israel in February 2026, days before attack on Iran by Israel and US, was lambasted by Opposition of weakening the country’s security, it, however, fits into the increasingly clear narrative of India's global importance, its role as a leading power, not one played by more powerful rivals. This is true given current militarization of foreign relations, which, in turn, increases the number of potential contenders for hegemony. Besides the two main players, US and China, there’s also Japan, Republic of Korea, Russia, and, on the other hand, North Korea and Iran. 

Extended Neighbourhood Strategy

During 2009 Shangri La Conference, Defence Secretary Robert Gates further defined India’s role as a "net security provider " for countries bordering Indian Ocean, in ensuring their security and engaging in “military diplomacy” when necessary, using India’s own army and navy. The role assigned to India by Gates aligns with its raison d'état, as it has long considered countries of this region its sphere of influence, and Indian diplomacy treats them as a key destination for economic investment and a shared cultural and civilizational heritage. 

The Mahasagar (Great Ocean) strategy, launched by Modi in 2025, envisions mutual and holistic growth and security for all South Asian nations. Additionally, it encompasses a much broader geographic area, a “stretched neighbourhood.” It was preceded by Sagar strategyfocused on Indian Ocean basin countries located near India, already well into maritime dimension of “Belt and Road” policy. 

India has presented its own proposals for cooperation in the region several years ago, Indo-Pacific Initiative (IPOI), in 2019. In 2017, at QUAD summit in Manila, India, with Australia, Japan, and US, reaffirmed readiness to strengthen partnership to militarily and diplomatically contain China’s ambitions in the region and in South China Sea in particular. 

India is active in numerous regional forums such as Indo-Pacific Economic Forum and Indian Ocean Rim Association. Understandably, by activating its relations with East Asian countries under the ActEast policy and finding allies, India is entering China’s sphere of influence. 

The implementation of Act East Policy iscontingent on ties with neighbours, proper functioning and balancing which is crucial for it. India is bounded to the north by the Himalayas, so road infrastructure is essential, requiring harmonious cooperation across the region, which has a Muslim population. 

The India Neighbourhood Policy encompasses India’s key foreign policy priorities, focusing on Indian Ocean basin, an area of exceptional strategic importance. Countries located close to India, have already found themselves in advanced stages of China’s maritime “Belt and Road”policy. Chinese port investments in Sri Lanka (port of Hambantota), Chinese port in Doraleh near Djibutti, political and economic rapprochement, and similar Chinese maritime investments with Maldives, Myanmar, and Pakistan are stirring emotions in India. 

New Delhi is trying to match China’s port investments, including Chabahar port in Iran and Sittwe port in Myanmar. Their effectiveness could threaten Washington’s strategic goals in this region. India is striving for dominance, however, countries bordering Indian Ocean don’t necessarily agree with its asserted position of dominance, and bilateral relations with them are rife with anti-Indian sentiment stemming from historical experiences that tend to define India as an interventionist power. Furthermore, the complex internal situation of these countries, having Muslim populations, may now further complicate implementation of this policy. 

Bilateral Ties

Relations between India and Pakistan are the most frayed. New Delhi fears renewed terrorist attacks in Kashmir, especially under Sharif’s government. Both Washington and Beijing are using internal tensions in Pakistan to unsettle India, as is evident with recent outbreak of Pakistan-Afghan conflict. 

Relations with Bangladesh remain unstable following fall of Hasina's regime. Mutual distrust persists, fuelled by infiltration of terrorists on either side. The new government shall seek to improve relations, as Prime Minister Tariq Rahman understands, but not at expense of its  political independence. 

Another example of instability is Maldives. President Mohamed Muizu won the presidency in 2023 under slogan “India Out, for India Out.” The new government is seeking to deepen military alliances with China, while terminating similar cooperation agreements with India, which has jeopardized viability of India's strategy in Indian Ocean region. 

Road infrastructure is being built through Myanmar as part of ActEast policy, so India must maintain good relations with General Hlaing’s ruling junta, despite criticism from Western countries. China continues to attempt to seize lands in Ladakh and Galwan Valley. Nepal is  engaging in similar “cartographic anti-diplomacy,” currently printing maps claiming lands which belong to India. 

Indian and Chinese political interest and economic investments intersect in this vast area. However, it seems both are trying to prevent a conflict. China, as a highly centralized state ruled by Communist Party, is a difficult opponent for democratic India. Diplomats on both sides navigate an understandable lack of trust with the need to balance their mutual relations. 

Between US &China

Indian politicians are aware that President Trump’s administration views South and Southeast Asian countries as a kind of “line of resistance” to China’s aspirations, and Washington sees India as a component of this line, potentially to be “used’ in a strategy to contain Chinese activity. Will India manage to balance its Mahasagarpolicy to avoid American and Chinese pressure while continuing its policy of independence? 

Indian politicians realise given their current economic, technological, material, and human resources, they are unable to use force and employ tactics of “diplomatic pushback” or “soft refusal” toward China and Washington. Perhaps one reason India has not expressed its position on Ukraine or Gazaconflicts and remains ambiguous viz kidnapping of Venezuelan president, preferring to rely on interpretations of international law. 

New trade tariffs imposed by Americans explain the emergence of anti-American sentiment in India. Externally imposed thesis that India should prioritize American interests over its own in mutual relations and consider itself a “useful country” needed by Americans to implement their policies, is unacceptable. 

Mutual visits and bilateral talks demonstrate how difficult relations with Washington are, as both sides have differing interests and policy goals in the region. It’s believed US will constantly pressure India to adapt to its policy objectives. This is inevitable, given India's ambition to become fourth power after US, China, and Russia. Indian politicians must skilfully“play” with US administration if they want to avoid being excluded from Washington's foreign policy strategy in Asian region, while maintaining established freedom in foreign relations. 

India’s foreign policy is irritating Trump administration, as evidenced by FBI’s arrest of Ashley Tellis, an “influencer” of Indian interests in US, who used his senior position at Carnegie Foundation. Americans’ dissatisfaction with India’s freedom in formulating its immediate and long-term policy goals has too been expressed through introduction of various restrictions/limitations on visa policy, suspension of student visas, criticism against close ties with Moscow, etc. US is also concerned over emerging trilateral alliance between India, Russia, and China.---INFA 

(Copyright, India News & Feature Alliance)

Round The World

New Delhi, 17 July 2026

West Asia on Fire Again

NEW DELHI TO RE-ENGAGE

By Dr. D.K. Giri

(Prof. of Practice, Inst of Management Bhubaneshwar) 

Just 30 days after the guns fell silent; West Asia is on fire again.  On June 14, 2026, a historic Memorandum of Understanding was signed between US and Iran to end hostilities. It gave a 60-day window to resolve the core disputes. Today, that window is shattered. Explosions have returned to Tehran, Tel Aviv, and the Gulf.  

The ceasefire did not fail because of one missile. It failed because the deal was built on sand. Three reasons stand out to me: unresolved core disputes, faulty execution, and wrong negotiators. 

The core disputes were never resolved. A ceasefire without addressing the “why” of the war is just a pause for reloading. First, Uranium: Iran insists on its right to enrich uranium as a matter of national sovereignty. The hardliners in Tehran call any rollback a betrayal of dignity.  The US and Israel insist on “zero enrichment.” For Washington and Jerusalem, any Iranian nuclear capability is an existential red line.  There was no middle ground in the MoU. So the MoU collapsed. 

Second, the Strait of Hormuz: 20% of the world’s oil passes through this 33-km chokepoint. Tehran claims sole authority. Washington wants international control and “freedom of navigation.”  In a globalized economy, you cannot leave the world’s oil tap in the hands of one messianic and vengeful player. But you also cannot humiliate a sovereign nation at gunpoint. The MoU ducked this question. 

Third, domestic politics: No leader in Washington, Tehran, or Jerusalem can afford to look weak. In the US, it is Congress and AIPAC- American Israel Public Affairs Committee. In Iran, it is the IRGC and the bazaar. In Israel, it is the coalition and the street.  So every concession was spun as surrender. And every hardline statement killed the trust built in the negotiating room. 

The second reason is a faulty execution, a ceasefire without teeth. A ceasefire is not a press release. It is a military and diplomatic machine. This one had no engine. There were no inspection protocols for Iranian nuclear sites, no penalties for violations, no third-party monitors on the ground, no hotline between commanders. 

Worse, the tone of the principals made it worse. Diplomacy runs on predictability. When the lead negotiator’s public statements swing from adoration to abuse in 24 hours, adversaries stop listening. When a country speaks in multiple voices — the President, the Foreign Office, the Revolutionary Guard — the other side hears only the loudest gun. 

The consequence was that both sides used the “ceasefire” to rearm. Drones were moved, missiles were restocked, proxies were paid. We have seen this movie before. During the Cold War, disarmament talks often led to greater rearmament. The goal was parity, not peace. 

Peace cannot be brokered by those who have no credibility. Pakistan was suddenly in the picture. A country blacklisted by FATF, struggling with its own internal contradictions and with a long record of harbouring terrorists, was projected as a “peace facilitator.”  It gave Islamabad some limelight. It did nothing for Tehran. Iran itself is not a single voice. Alongside the state are Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. When the state says “ceasefire” and the proxies fire rockets, who do you believe? 

And revenge is a poor foundation for diplomacy. Iran’s visceral hatred for Israel, and Israel’s determination to prevent a nuclear Iran, meant the talks were about tactics, not trust. 

Why should India care? Because West Asia is not far. It is our extended neighborhood. India’s stakes consist of the following. Energy: 60% of India’s crude and 70% of our LNG comes through the Strait of Hormuz. A closure means $120 oil and runaway inflation at home. Diaspora: 9 million Indians live in the Gulf. They send $50 billion in remittances. Their safety is India’s responsibility.  Connectivity: Chabahar Port and the IMEC — India-Middle East-Europe Corridor — are central to India’s trade future. A war closes both. Terror: A distracted Iran and a cornered Pakistan mean more space for terror groups to operate. 

We cannot be spectators. And we cannot be neutral. In war, neutrality is a myth. Even Lord Krishna advised his brother Balram on the eve of the epic battle, Mahabharata. He said, “When there is a fight between dharma and adharma (virtue and vice), you cannot remain indifferent or aloof. 

Pakistan’s failure is India’s opening. New Delhi has credibility in all three capitals — Washington, Tehran, and Jerusalem. That is rare. Below is the 4-point blueprint India can offer: Prepare a peace blueprint, not just statements. India should quietly draft a workable deal and share it with all sides. 

The core: “Zero weaponization, not zero enrichment.” Iran keeps civilian enrichment under IAEA cameras. US/Israel get verifiable limits.  

On Hormuz: joint patrols with India, UAE, and Oman as guarantors. No single country owns the tap. be honest about our ties. We should not be defensive about our proximity to Israel. Israel, UAE, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia are all doing business today — I2U2 is proof.  India can tell Iran: “We are friends with Israel and with you. Use us as a bridge, not an enemy.” 

Protect Indian interests on the ground. Activate the crisis cell for the diaspora. Fast-track Chabahar and IMEC projects. Build strategic oil reserves to 120 days.  Signal to the world: India will not allow its growth to be held hostage. Position India as the alternative supply chain.  Every war breaks or disrupt a supply chain. India can offer the world a stable alternative.  Pharma, engineering goods, food, digital services — “Make in India for the World” gains the most when others are fighting.  Hedge, don’t hope. 

This failed ceasefire teaches the world three things. First, agreements without verification are invitations to war.  Second, in a multi-polar world, leadership will go to the power that can talk to all and be trusted by all. Third, it validates the saying that “all wars are a consequence of failure of diplomacy”. US is transactional. China is revanchist. Russia is distracted. India is the only major power with civilizational ties, economic stakes, and no baggage of colonization in West Asia, nor any history of aggrandisement. 

The Iran-US MoU failed because it tried to freeze a war without solving it.  It failed because it had no mechanism.  It failed because it had no moral authority. India must not repeat that mistake.  We must move from “we are concerned” to “here is our proposal.”  A fragile ceasefire is worse than no ceasefire. It resonates with local saying in parts of India, “No show is better than a poor show”. However, it gives false hope and real time to rearm. India’s time is now. Not to take sides, but to take responsibility.  Because in a world of wars, the nation that brings peace — will lead. ---INFA 

(Copyright, India News & Feature Alliance)

REWIND

New Delhi, 14 July 2026

Free India’s Great Failure

By Inder Jit

(Released on 19 September 1978) 

Nature alone is not to blame for the floods which have savagely hit India this year. Man is also greatly responsible for what has alas come to pass --- and for the unprecedented devastation. Undoubtedly, not a little has been done during the past 30 years. In terms of money, Rs.633 crores has been expended so far on flood protection measures. Dibrugarh in Assam has, for instance, been saved from being devoured by the Brahmaputra. Flood protection has been given to over 9 million hectares out of 20 million hectares requiring it. Nevertheless, as the recent floods have shown, the major problem remains largely untackled. Some veterans among acknowledged experts doubt if even Rs. 200 crores has been spent actually on flood control measures. My investigation over the past week reveals a distressing story of inaction, muddling, corruption and absurdities. Indeed, these largely confirm a dominant impression of many informed observers: the latest flood havoc symbolise one of free India’s great failures. 

India has suffered a damage of Rs.6,500 crores since 1953, according to available statistics. In addition, thousands of human lives and cattle have been lost. Yet, we do not still have a comprehensive programme for flood control or an integrated plan of national action. Unlike in the case of famine, the Government of India does not even have a manual or blue book on floods to help organise speedy relief, as Delhi’s Mayor and other leaders discovered to their dismay. Other absurdities abound and are symbolised by two chance discoveries. Under an old agreement, Delhi is barred from drawing more than 100 cusecs from the Yamuna for its requirement. It is consequently constrained to “buy” water for drinking and other use from Bhakra, Haryana and UP. It has agreed to pay UP Rs. 60 lakhs annually for 200 cusecs of drinking water from the Ramganga reservoir, apart from providing the conduit pipes at a cost of Rs. 8 crores. That is not all. It is also required to pay for the Yamuna water it uses for cooling its “C” power station in Indraprastha Estate. 

Much of the trouble has arisen due to an astonishing absence of any specific reference to “flood control” in the Constitution – either in the Union, State or Concurrent list. Thoughts at the Centre in regard to river waters and their regulation and development were consequently confined initially to their use for irrigation and power generation. Flood control came to be accepted as belonging to the State sector – a matter in which the Centre gladly acquiesced. New Delhi first became conscious of the problem on a national basis only in 1954 when the country suffered disastrous floods and the Nehru Government was forced to sit up. In fact, the Central Water and Power Commission did not have a flood wing until tht year. As Dr. Kanwar Sain, then Chairman of the CWPC, candidly recalled in a stimulating talk: “We did not even have authentic information in regard to the extent of the floods or the havoc caused. Newspapers were our only source of information!” 

The situation was sought to be corrected. A National Flood Control Programme was launched and in 1956 legislation was enacted to empower the Centre to establish River Boards to draw up comprehensive plans for regulation and development of inter-State rivers and help the States implement them. Schemes were then prepared for setting up initially River Boards for the Narmada, Krishna, Godavari and Kaveri. But all the four Boards were scuttled by the concerned States in 1963 even though Parliament had voted monies for their establishment. These States cleverly exploited certain lacunae in the Act to interpret the provision for “consultation” to mean “consent”. Eventually, Dr. K.L. Rao, then Minister, dropped the Boards since nothing could be achieved without the cooperation of the States. Instead, he decided to get the Central Water and Power Commission to draw up the schemes and sought Rs.4 crores for the purpose. But this proposal, too, got shot down. 

No one need be surprised by the attitude of the States. Over the years, powerful vested interests have grown around funds provided for flood control, widely acknowledged as “easy money” since a proper check on its disbursement is difficult. Kosi, once known as the river of sorrow, brought, for instance, much joy and affluence to not a few. (Experts reckon that on an average not more than Rs. 40 is actually spent on flood control out of every Rs.100 sanctioned.) Vested interest has, moreover, grown around floods itself. Most flood-prone States are now to look forward not only to the traditional rabi and kharif crops but also to the special “relief crop” which brings them by far the best dividends – maximum return on minimum or zero investment! Of interest in this context was a strong plea by an MP recently during Parliament’s monsoon session for provision of sizeable funds for flood relief in his State. When the Minister pointed out that there was no floods in the State, pat came the reply: “But, Sir, they will be coming soon.” 

Can the situation be remedied? Yes. The Centre has the requisite power under the Constitution to directly undertake flood control, even if the two words do not occur in it. Item 56 in the Union List authorises the Centre to enact legislation for the “regulation and development of inter-State rivers and river valleys to the extent to which such regulation and development under the control of the Union is declared by Parliament by aw to be expedient in public interest.” The States also have power in regard to “water supplies, irrigation and canals and drainage and embankments” under item 17 of the States List. Significantly, however, these are “subject to the provisions of entry 56 of the Union List.” Doubts in the matter, I am told, were firmly set at rest by the former Attorney General some four years ago, thanks to the initiative and perseverance of the Central Water Commission. In fact, an Inter-State Rivers and River Valleys (Regulation and Development) Bill was even drafted early in 1975. But the Emergency pushed it into cold storage. 

Happily, the Union Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation has reacted promptly and positively to the latest flood disaster. A working group has been set up to prepare within three months the outline of an integrated flood control project for implementation during the next five to seven years – and a Plan of Action which will have an “immediate effect” in reducing the intensity of floods. A sub-group on major engineering works will draw up priorities for schemes in 14 flood-prone rivers and any other river or tributary in the Indo-Gangetic basin. It will also examine the need for legislative and other administrative measures for regulation of human settlements. A second sub-group on watershed management will identify priority catchment and suggest action needed for checking indiscriminate-deforestation and abuse of land which accelerates erosion. But all their labour may end up as an exercise in futility unless the Centre pulls the aforementioned draft bill out of its shelves and arms itself with adequate powers. 

Authoritative sources do not accept the view that the periodicity or intensity of floods has increased since independence or that floods have increased due to reduction of forests and vegetal cover. Nevertheless, many Janata leaders believe that large-scale deforestation in the Himalayas is mainly responsible for the flood havoc in the Ganga basin. Invaluable satellite pictures show, for instance, that the recent unprecedented floods in Uttar Kashi were caused by criminal deforestation. Records with the UP Government reportedly show that forests cover 85 per cent of the area in Uttar Kashi as against 15 per cent now shown in the satellite pictures. Consequent soil erosion has led to heavy silting of river beds – and more floods. The extent of situation is not generally known. As the Union Minister, MR. H.N. Bahuguna, told a seminar on “The People and Forest” in January last: ‘Erosion in the case of Sutlej is 150 acre feet and in that of Yamuna 400 acre feet in catchment area of 100 sq miles. In sharp contrast, erosion over a corresponding area is only 1 acre feet for Colombia and 6 acre feet for Mississippi in the USA.” 

In the final analysis, however, floods cannot be eliminated. We have to learn to live and dance with them, as Assam’s former Chief Minister, Mr. Sarat Sinha, once told me in Gauhati. This principle is incorporated in the concept of Flood Plain Zoning, which seeks to determine the areas likely to be affected by floods and to develop those areas in a way that the damage is minimized. A model bill for flood plain zoning was circulated by the Centre in September 1974 to the chronically-flood affected States of Assam, Bihar, Orissa, UP and West Bengal. The question was reviewed by the States in 1975 and again in 1976. But even the Emergency did not help. The scheme has still not been given “due importance” by the States. Incidentally, Cambodia has made good use of the concept. During the floods, its Grand Lake spreads over 10,000 sq kms as against 3,000 sq kms normally. But no great damage is caused. Instead of travelling around by road, people move about in boats. 

New Delhi has done well to allocate Rs.700 acres for flood control over the next five years. This amount is, however, not likely to achieve much, as Rs.450 crores alone are required for the on-going schemes. Latest official thinking, therefore, favours about Rs.1,000 crores to Rs. 1,200 crores. But even this amount will not help unless the Centre takes full charge of the flood control problem as done in the USA, the USSR and now in China. The key to flood control in the Ganga basin lies primarily in India and not in Nepal, as suggested by some Bihar leaders. New Delhi must watch out against alibis for inaction and seek cooperation of Nepal only where necessary on the basis of a quid pro quo. Meanwhile, the Rashtriya Barh Ayog, headed by Mr. Jaisukh Lal Hathi, Punjab Governor, could perhaps be asked to submit an interim report. As Dr. Kanwar Sain, who was Engineering Director of the Mekong (Maha Ganga) Project for nine years said: “Thirty years have been largely wasted. Let us now get on with the job.” ---INFA 

(Copyright, India News & Feature Alliance)