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Chinese Incursions into Arunachal: HOW DOES INDIA RESPOND?, By Prof (Dr) D.K. Giri, 13 August 2026 Print E-mail

Round The World

New Delhi, 13 August 2026

Chinese Incursions into Arunachal

HOW DOES INDIA RESPOND?

By Prof (Dr) D.K. Giri

(Prof of Practice, Institute of Management, Bhubaneswar) 

The villagers in Arunachal Pradesh have lodged complaints that the PLA is taking their land inch-by-inch and even whisking away their livestock. People in Ladakh have been making similar complaints. 

The initial reaction of the Government of India is often denial, or the assurance that the matter will be investigated. Some TV channels have even suggested, rather viciously, that these complaints are orchestrated by vested interests to tarnish the image of the Indian Army and embarrass the Union Government. 

Be that as it may, there is no gainsaying the hard fact: China took away 38,000 sq km in Aksai Chin and the Shaksgam Valley in 1962. Since then, through “salami-slicing” and disputes along the LAC — Line of Actual Control — it continues to contest and occupy another 4,800 sq km of Indian territory. 

To trace the chronology of Incursions, the pattern is old, but the intensity is new. 1956: China built a road through Aksai Chin and issued maps showing it as Chinese territory; 1959: The first serious military clash at Longju in NEFA. The same year, the Dalai Lama sought asylum in India after the uprising in Tibet, adding a strategic dimension to the border; 1962: A full-scale war. China advanced, declared a unilateral ceasefire, and retained Aksai Chin.  

One is reminded of a famous anecdote in Parliament. When Nehru, replying to a debate on Chinese incursion, said, “The land on which the Chinese have built the roads is such that there is not a blade of grass nor a human being,” a Member of Parliament, Mahavir Tyagi shot back: “Sir, for the last several years there is not a single hair on this head, but for that reason shall I surrender my head to the enemy?” 

Then, 1967: Nathu La conflict in Sikkim. 80 Indian soldiers died; 1975: Tulung La ambush in Arunachal; 1986-87: Sumdorong Chu standoff; 2013: Depsang incursion in Ladakh; 2017: Doklam standoff on the China-Bhutan-India tri-junction. The faceoff lasted 73 days; 2020-2022: The most serious period since 1962. In June 2020, PLA and the Indian Army clashed at Galwan Valley. An Indian Colonel was killed during a flag meeting. In the subsequent combat, 20 Indian soldiers died. Indian media claimed 40+ Chinese casualties, though China never confirmed. Since then, China has enhanced its position through infrastructure development and salami-slicing tactics. 

Thereafter, multiple friction points emerged in Ladakh: Galwan, Depsang, Pangong. Both sides have deployed in large numbers ever since. Observers contend that incursions by the PLA are now a frequent occurrence. 

The core problem: the borders have not been concretely demarcated. They are managed on the basis of the LAC. China does not adhere to this convention and seeks to alter it unilaterally. As NSA Ajit Doval once noted in negotiations, China has a habit of claiming any disputed territory as its own by default. This claim is untenable. 

How Should India Respond? Revisit the 3Cs. India’s traditional China strategy has oscillated between Confrontation, Containment, and Collaboration. New Delhi shifts from one to another depending on geopolitics. For instance, when, Donald Trump, in his second term appeared hostile to India and propped up Pakistan as an interlocutor in the Iran issue, New Delhi seemed to move closer to China, the main strategic rival of the United States. One hopes this was optics, not a substantive shift in China policy. 

What we need now is a fresh strategy with four pillars: Military, Diplomatic, Economic, and Civil Societal. Military: Deterrence through Presence, the Indian military is not what it was in 1962. Beyond loyalty and commitment, it has evolved in R&D and now produces sophisticated weaponry. The BrahMos missile is in demand across the developing world. 

But one lesson of 1962 remains: we lacked connectivity to the borders. We still lag China. Therefore: Build border roads, airstrips, and bridges along the LAC on a war-footing. Galwan showed that presence matters. You cannot claim what you cannot reach. Maintain parity and quick reaction capability in Ladakh and Arunachal. Use drones, satellites, and sensors to detect salami-slicing early and react before positions harden. 

Diplomatic: Carrot, Stick, and Third Parties, use existing mechanisms for dialogue — SR (Special Representative) talks, WMCC - Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs— but remember: talks can become a delaying tactic while facts change on the ground.  In the BRICS Summit next month on 12-13 in New Delhi, Russian President Putin has decided to come. Chinese Premier Xi Jinping is also expected. Should he come, Govt of India and Indians should make a strong presentation of our concerns on the border. 

China’s playbook is well known. It penetrates a distance into “no man’s land” or even Indian territory, and after negotiations retreats half of it as a “concession,” retaining the other half. It keeps pushing while offering to talk. As Sun Tzu said in The Art of War, deception is central to Chinese strategy. We must not be induced into believing that “all is normal.” 

We should also involve third parties. Unlike Pakistan, China is a bigger and more dangerous rival. Bilateralism alone will not suffice. Doklam was defused partly because Bhutan issued a demarche. ASEAN matters. And the Quad should be the most formidable bulwark against China, notwithstanding the ambivalence of any single leader. The Quad’s strategic value must not be diluted. 

Economic: Raise the Cost, India is a big market. China has huge exports to India. New Delhi must use this interdependence as leverage. Sadly, Indian imports from China are phenomenally increasing, widening the trade deficit. Trade cannot be delinked from territory. We must connect economic access to responsible behaviour on the border. Concessions in trade cannot be given as goodwill while territorial integrity is challenged. 

Civil Society: Voice from the Ground, in a democracy, the government is not the only player. Media, market, and masses must respond. The cries of villagers in Arunachal and Ladakh should not go unheard. Their security is also our first line of defense. When civil society raises its voice against incursions, it sends a message both to Beijing and to our own citizens living precariously on the frontier: the nation stands with them. 

China’s incursions are not random. They are calibrated, incremental, and aimed at changing facts without war. India’s response cannot be ad-hoc either. We need roads that reach the last post, diplomacy that does not concede ground, an economy that raises costs for aggression, and a society that refuses to normalize encroachment.

The land in Aksai Chin may have “not a blade of grass,” but it is still our head. And as Mahavir Tyagi reminded Nehru, we do not surrender our head.---INFA

 

(Copyright, India News & Feature Alliance)

 

 

Understanding Youth Unrest: CHANGE IN OUTLOOK CRITICAL, By Dhurjati Mukherjee, 12 August 2026 Print E-mail

Open Forum

New Delhi, 12 August 2026

Understanding Youth Unrest

CHANGE IN OUTLOOK CRITICAL

By Dhurjati Mukherjee 

The recent youth protests triggered by the Cockroach Janata Party (CJP) in Delhi and other cities has brought to the forefront the concerns and demands of a generation now broadly labelled as Gen Z. What began as anger over examination irregularities has evolved into a wider expression of frustration over education, unemployment and lack of accountability. The movement’s ability to mobilise young people has already made its political significance difficult to ignore. 

Reports of similar unrest emerging in Jharkhand raise the larger question of what lies ahead. Whether these protests remain isolated expressions of anger or develop into a sustained youth movement will depend largely on how seriously the underlying grievances are addressed. 

While acknowledging their problems, RSS chief, Mohan Bhagwat, described protests as a legitimate way of dialogue and said that Gen Z agitators were not, as accused, ‘anti-nationals’ but our own people, becoming the latest saffron heavyweight to connect with the concerns of the youth. “A protest is also a way of dialogue. In a democracy, protests are also a way of building consensus”, he told a conference of around 2000 students in Mumbai recently. Further, the RSS chief stressed that protests must remain within democratic norms although he made no reference to the young demonstrators’ abusive slogans against Prime Minister Modi.   

In fact, it is rumoured that he played an important role in persuading the government to accept the demands of the CJP and put an end to the protests, which were spreading like fire. Moreover, when questioned about the need for substantial reforms in education and raising educational spending to 6 per cent of the GDP, Bhagwat reportedly agreed but unfortunately just over 4 per cent is being spent by the government presently.  

Modi is trying to make amends. Speaking to students a few days ago at IIT, Delhi he stated the young generation must use its knowledge and skills to build a developed and skilled India, adding that the next 30 years of the lives of today’s youth would have a major impact on the journey towards becoming a developed nation. But the question arises – are the opportunities existent at present? The gap between aspiration and opportunity is widening, and it is this gap that is fuelling much of the frustration now visible among the youth. 

The demographic cohort that falls in the age bracket of 14-29 may, according to certain estimates, comprise over 35 per cent of the country’s population. Yet their cumulative representation in Parliament and legislatures reads just six MPs and 30 MLAs at present. The main reason for this may be attributed to the fact that the young generation is not interested in entering politics and is fed up with the political leaders, most of whom are enmeshed in corruption and least concerned about their welfare. Another reason is the minimum age for contesting polls in 25 years and maybe it needs to be lowered if we want more young people in the legislatures. The disparity remains even when the age bracket is raised to 40. 

There are only 397 legislators who are under 40 years of age out of a total of 4000 MLAs in the country. The government’s apathy to the youth protest signifies institutional myopia. In our country, more importance is given to the experience of political leaders, and this robs parties of dynamism and energy demonstrated by the youth. The most serious repercussion arguably is the lack of an even playing field in tandem with the indifference, even occasional condescension, of senior leaders which makes youth cynical about politics and its institutions.

The CJP’s popularity amongst the youth can be attributed to their disdain for a traditional, entrenched, unresponsive political coterie. The youth is a major force in society today and their demands and necessities cannot be ignored at any cost. 

The government, in evolving a future strategy, must keep in mind the concerns of the youth who have been struggling to find themselves in society. They do not have much respect for the policies of the present dispensation, as the above data will reveal and do not want to join politics, except for agitating for their demands. Meanwhile, the steady loss of autonomy of higher educational institutions has been a cause of concern as unfettered expression of views and, in fact, the whole academic atmosphere is being eroded. Further, is the deterioration of the quality of teaching at almost all levels, except for a few institutions such as the IITs, IIMs and some central universities. 

It is worth noting that the international ranking by the Varieties of Democracy latest Academic Freedom Index project places India among the lowest 10 to 20 per cent of 179 countries and territories across the globe. Academic freedom today is even lower than in the years of the Emergency and the lowest since 1900. Freedom of expression is gradually being stifled as many universities and teachers have been practising self-censorship so as not to annoy the government. Analysts have repeatedly pointed out that the university is a place of free intellectual exploration through questioning, debate and discussion. There can be no place for throttling the voice of students.   

In such a situation, not just the Centre but also the state governments have to deeply think on the matter and it would be prudent if they could evolve a policy aimed at understanding the problems and aspirations of the students and youth. The main focus has to be on the education sector with necessary reforms, and increasing allocation and expenditure of education from schools to universities and a level-playing field for all segments of society. 

Though education is on the Concurrent List, the expenditure of the Central government in improving conditions of schools in remote and backward areas leaves much to be desired. Even public universities in big cities are facing fund shortage, research scholarships are coming down, not to speak of what is happening in semi-urban areas. 

All this has been agitating the youth for quite a few years as they have been feeling helpless in such a situation. Even their teachers want a better deal for the youth community, thinking about their future as also that of the country. What will happen to the nation’s future if the youth are not geared in the right direction and proper facilities extended to them to build up their careers? Opportunities should exist not just for the rich and the upper middle class but for all sections, specially who have to struggle in rural areas to build up their career.  Even a farmer or a very small trader’s son has the right to get quality education in the village school or college but unfortunately the government is oblivious to this. 

There needs to be a fundamental change in the outlook of the government in its own interest. The popularity of the present government may be jeopardised if it does not respond to the young generation in a positive and judicious manner.---INFA 

(Copyright, India News & Feature Alliance)

 

 

 

RSS: Damage Control For Gen Z: RAP ON KNUCKLES FOR BJP?, By Poonam I Kaushish, 10 Aug 2026 Print E-mail

Political Diary                                                                                                                 

New Delhi, 10 August 2026

RSS: Damage Control For Gen Z

RAP ON KNUCKLES FOR BJP?

By Poonam I Kaushish

 

Politics is unpredictable. Anything can happen. Till a month back there was no stopping Prime Minister Modi’s electoral and political juggernaut.  Who would have imagined that Gen Z-CJP which accounts for 35% of electorate would set in motion a potentially formidable political fault line, three years before the next elections. Warning of turbulent times ahead.

 

In steps Sangh parent body, RSS Chief Mohan Bhagwat. Not with a political or ideological speech. But with a speech whose real meaning lies not in what is said, but in what and whom it quietly rebukes. His recent intervention on Gen Z last week, belongs firmly in the third category and makes it significant going beyond what BJP has so far conceded.

 

At face value, it is an ode to Gen Z, which he says, is not misguided, directionless and certainly not automatically anti-national merely because it takes to the streets. Its grievances on education reforms and paper leaks can be genuine. Protest, he reminds us, is part of democracy and can become a means of dialogue and consensus when conventional channels fail.

 

But the real sting lay elsewhere: “True leadership is not about delivering speeches, winning elections or preaching to people, but about working from behind, leadership comes from within….Leader should possess knowledge, appreciate qualities of others, share success and fame with everyone.” 

 

Undoubtedly, a sharp rap on the knuckles for BJP leadership and its political culture increasingly comfortable with command rather than conversation. Arguing, youth asks questions and demands logic, and therefore cannot be handled through the old grammar of unquestioning obedience.

 

In the Sangh ecosystem, this fits a familiar pattern: RSS publicly indicating its discomfort with BJP’s handling of politically sensitive issues while falling short of any direct confrontation. The RSS Chief’s authority comes from occupying a space close enough to influence Government yet sufficiently separate to distance the organisation from every decision of the Government.

For years, dissent has been answered not with ‘why are you angry’ and ‘what is your grievance? But with who is behind you? Are you anti-national? Whereby, the political vocabulary becomes remarkably convenient: protest becomes conspiracy, criticism becomes disloyalty, disagreement becomes sedition.

 

Hence, as part of damage control, Bhagwat advised BJP leadership not to underestimate but understand young people. Not via dictation but discussion, not orders but consensus. Good leaders don’t command young citizens; they convince them. Governments shouldn’t dismiss protest; they should listen and engage with it. “Kami toh rahi hai that should not have happened, so protesters should not be branded anti-national; they should be heard.

 

Thereby, laying down a principle of leadership, which is not exercise of authority for its own sake. It is the ability to persuade, explain, listen and absorb anger without treating it as rebellion. Signalling, the old lexis of dismissing dissent will not work indefinitely.

 

Underscoring, a Government that recognises this distinction might win an election but it does not win ownership of the electorate. As citizens do not surrender their democratic rights merely because they have elected a Government.

 

Besides, the Gen Z protests demonstrated something the Establishment might have underestimated: This is a generation that is digitally connected, politically impatient and considerably less deferential to authority. It doesn’t fear the State as earlier generations did. It questions, it fact-checks, it mobilizes and broadcasts. When ignored, it takes to the streets.

 

Giving RSS room to say: We are listening even if Government is not.  An institutional signalling and insurance as Gen Z protests punctured the carefully cultivated image of an all-powerful and all-knowing BJP Establishment. The streets have demonstrated political power has limits and youth who were perhaps, expected to be absorbed into the ruling narrative, instead, created a storyline of their own. 

That is politically dangerous, Bhagwat emphasized. As BJP seems to forget: Governments come and go, but social legitimacy is harder to rebuild once lost. BJP may survive an angry protest. It cannot afford to become a Party that an entire generation instinctively distrusts. And Gen Z would eventually become a formidable electoral constituency. 

Pertinently, the “traitor” question is the real political fault line. Bhagwat refuses to equate dissent with disloyalty or turning political disagreement into a test of patriotism. A student demanding examination reform is not a traitor, neither is one angry about paper leaks or a citizen protesting Governmental failure. 

If this is genuinely the new doctrine, protest as a democratic expression then it cannot apply selectively or be invoked when Gen Z becomes electorally consequential and forgotten when inconvenient protesters appear elsewhere. 

The real test is not whether Bhagwat said the right thing but whether the political ecosystem associated with RSS can behave differently. Because words are cheap, institutional behaviour is not. If protesters continue being beaten, detained or branded anti-national before their grievances are examined, then a sermon on dialogue becomes political cosmetics. 

If police excesses are brushed aside, if accountability disappears into committees, if reforms are promised and then quietly buried in the dustbin of history, then “consensus” becomes another word for managing dissent. And Gen Z is unlikely to be fooled by semantics. 

Precisely, why Bhagwat’s speech should be read as a caveat. He is telling the Establishment that the old machinery of command-and-control has diminishing returns. His message to Gen Z is, in effect: We see you. We understand you are different. We know you ask questions and will not simply obey. Therefore we need to change the way we speak to you. 

Ironically, Gen Z may have achieved something bigger than its immediate demands. It has forced the Establishment to change its vocabulary. From, how do we control protesters? To, how do we understand them? That is no small achievement. Yesterday, protesters were an enemy of the State. Today, protest is a legitimate democratic instrument. Whether it produces substantive change is to be seen. 

Though, Bhagwat has not broken ranks with Modi–Shah. He has done something more politically intelligent: Reminding them of the limits of power as the younger generation will no longer accept “because I said so” politics. The Government may command police, bureaucracy and Parliamentary majority. But it cannot permanently command public consent. That has to be earned. 

Significantly, the RSS Chief offers BJP a route back from confrontation to conversation without requiring it to surrender its ideological or political positions. Whether it takes that, time will tell. Cautioning, you cannot govern an increasingly questioning generation with yesterday’s tools. 

So far, Modi televised overture to Gen Z sounded sympathetic but ended up getting it all wrong resulting in memes and irreverent songs mocking him. Indicating, winds of ill-will are blowing against  BJP. Can it halt this before it becomes a hurricane? 

The biggest danger to Modi–Shah is of Gen Z becoming a mood.  Perhaps that is the real lesson. Leadership is not about making people fall in line. Leadership is making people believe that they have been heard. The question is whether the Government has understood this and will it act. As Gen Z says: clock it? ----- INFA 

(Copyright India News & Feature Alliance)

 

5-year Low - Factories Sans Jobs: GROWTH WITHOUT DEMAND, By Shivaji Sarkar, 10 Aug 2026 Print E-mail

Economic Highlights

New Delhi, 10 August 2026

5-year Low - Factories Sans Jobs

GROWTH WITHOUT DEMAND

By Shivaji Sarkar 

India’s manufacturing, services sector growth continues to hit lows amid falling demand and poor wage rises.Manufacturing remains low around 14 percent while it needs manufacturing base around 25–30percent of GDP. 

A country with such a huge population needed mass job creation outside agriculture and informal work decades ago. Instead, too many workers remain stuck in low-paying jobs with limited opportunities. A stronger manufacturing sector could have absorbed rural workers, boosted exports, increased incomes, and reduced pressure on agriculture. 

India's labour-intensive manufacturing sectors—including textiles, apparel, leather, footwear and wood products—continue to underperform, while even basic metals and capital goods face cyclical slowdowns. The key constraints are high logistics costs, weak research and development, limited access to affordable credit for MSMEs, and persistent supply-chain bottlenecks. 

These structural weaknesses have reduced global competitiveness, slowed job creation and prevented manufacturing from becoming the broad-based engine of growth needed to absorb India's expanding workforce. This indicates that overall demand deficiency is bogging the manufacturing growth.  

The seasonally adjusted HSBC India Services PMI Business Activity Index – based on a single question asking how the level of business activity compares with the situation the month before – remained above the neutral mark of 50 and therefore signalled another expansion in output. At 53.4 of PMI in July, the lowest since August 2021, it simply means demand contraction has put down sales as the pace of growth has hit its slowest rate in nearly five years. 

New business growth slowed to its weakest pace since February 2022, amid intense competition, softer demand and postponed orders. Job creation improved modestly in July after hitting a six-month low in June, but only 6percent of firms increased payrolls while 92percent reported no change. Meanwhile, input costs continued to rise, driven by higher fuel, labour, materials, technology and transportation expenses. 

Stagnant Decade

National sample data show that annual wage growth near 7percent from 2010 to 2016 dropped to near zero between 2015-16 and 2022-23. 

Job creation across India's manufacturing industry weakened for the third straight month in July. The rate of increase in employment was the slowest in the current 29-month period. 

The labour-intensive and traditional manufacturing sectors like textiles, apparel, leather, and wood products have experienced low or stagnant production growth relative to high-tech fields. 

Traditional garment and fabric production has faced long-term deceleration due to high logistics costs, and stiff regional competition. Export-oriented leather goods have struggled with sluggish global demand and domestic supply chain hurdles. 

Sub-sectors like wood and wood products have recorded negative long-term labour productivity growth. 

Basic metals and capital goods segments frequently register cyclical lows and slow output growth in factory data or Index of Industrial Production due to volatile domestic investment. 

Keeping domestic petroleum fuel costs high for revenue mopping has proved counter-productive. It may have got revenue to the government but the policy is lopsided. It increases transportation and operational costs, including production costs of many petroleum bases products, including plastic and a host of other items. It has hurt the industrial production as costs multiply, Logistics cost increase lead to low demand and low growth. costs. Expensive transport and complex last-mile freight make local production less competitive globally. 

Construction vs Other Sectors

Policy planners with the dilution of the Planning Commission are less heard. There is more stress on the construction and building industry without realising that subsidising buildings don’t make a manufacturing and overall productive nation. 

Another aspect that is overlooked is the stress on the land being used for construction of roads or other structures. The paucity of land is jacking up the land prices causing manufacturing and other activities expensive. 

Manufacturing and various other aspects of production in any sphere require R&D, including the leather industry. As overall costs rise whether marketing or product research suffers. 

Limited spending on innovation restricts a successful shift into high-margin precision manufacturing. 

Credit constraints also hit small and medium enterprises struggle to secure formal, low-cost working capital. One of the major reasons of credit lag is more bank and financial institution stress for long-term debt, some at least up to 17 years, blocking finances for other sectors. As per official data about Rs 10 lakh crore a year was being apportioned for the construction sector for the last over five years. 

Policy Change

It calls for critical policy change to boost diversified growth of the industrial sector. The banks, as various RBI, reports indicate are short of funds for jacking up the growth of various other sectors. Even agricultural expansion is compromised as products do not get the right prices and shift of arable land to constructions has reduced farm production.  It tells on the wages, rural or urban. 

Former Chief Economic Advisor, Arvind Subramanian, in one of his recent observations drew a distinction between the wages in the private sector and the public sector (PSU). The PSU wages are fixed to neutralise the inflationary aspect and keep it at a realistic level. The private sector on the contrary despite earning 16-17 percent to 45 percent profits have been miser in sharing the profits. 

The low wages create not only an artificial wedge but also hit the market. The purchasing power of the working class remains low. This does not create the required demand. This turns into a disincentive for the goods produced as the workers lack the capacity to buy. 

The sector remains 15–17percent of India's GDP below the long-standing 25percent GDP target, originally envisaged for 2025 but now pushed towards longer-term horizons. 

A slowdown or loss in India's manufacturing sector directly reduces credit demand and increases stress on micro, small, and medium enterprise (MSME) loan portfolios. Interest Coverage Ratio (ICR) data of RBI showed that the ICR for manufacturing companies dropped to 7.6 in the December quarter, falling 30 basis points due to lower earnings. (ICR measures a company's ability to pay interest on its debts using operating earnings.) 

Higher raw material expenses have occasionally squeezed profit margins, making debt repayment tighter for select mid-sized manufacturing units.

Interestingly, it is just not manufacturing, the IT sector is also contracting. India's IT sector is slowing due to weaker global demand, particularly from the US and Europe. 

The country has to look deeper, work out industrial and banking policies for revving up the economy and global standing.---INFA

 

(Copyright, India News & Feature Alliance)

 

 

ASEAN Treaty: VALUE FOR NEW ENTRANTS, 8 August 2026 Print E-mail

Spotlight

New Delhi, 8 August 2026

ASEAN Treaty

VALUE FOR NEW ENTRANTS

(Centre for Intl Relations, Poland) 

The 50thanniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), a cornerstone of ASEAN’s security architecture, on July 24 in Manila, paralleled the accession of Poland, Sweden, Romania and Lithuania. In practice, however, this gesture speaks volumes beyond the procedure itself. 

The entrants adopted ASEAN’s rules and institutional language late in the process, but at a time when the Indo-Pacific is increasingly ceasing to be a distant region for Europe and becoming part of its economic and political security. Therefore, the most important question is whether accession will remain merely a symbolic status gesture or will it mark the beginning of a more consistent European presence in the region. 

The seemingly procedural act can be interpreted as a status gesture by a state attempting to establish itself as a middle power. To understand the importance, let us take for example the case of Poland, a country with limited diplomatic resources, its attention riveted to its eastern flank and the war beyond its eastern border. For it the TAC is a cheap but highly signalling instrument. The treaty is political in nature and has no direct economic or financial implications; its value lies in the realm of status, institutional affiliation, and symbolism. 

The TAC was first signed in Bali on February 24, 1976, by the five founding members of ASEAN—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. It was the Association’s first legally binding treaty and its organisational pillar: the codification of the “ASEAN Way”—non-interference, consensual diplomacy, and peaceful resolution of disputes. 

Crucial to the treaty's role today was its gradual opening to the outside world: the document was amended three times—in 1987, 1998, and 2010—to allow accession by countries outside the region, and subsequently also by regional organisations. As President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. recalled during this year’s ceremony, Manila was the venue for the signing of the protocol that opened the treaty to countries beyond the founding members. 

For countries outside the region, joining the TAC isn’t just signing another document. It’s a way of saying to ASEAN: we recognise your principles and want to speak your language. Accession signifies acceptance of the Association’s central role and its code of conduct, based on non-interference, consensus, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. It also has a very practical dimension: joining the TAC was one of the three conditions for participation in the East Asia Summit, alongside dialogue partner status and significant economic relations with ASEAN. The treaty, therefore, acts as a kind of gateway to the region’s most important multilateral forums. 

The new entrants thus join a group that has long included all the major powers—China, the United States, Russia, India, and Japan—and, more importantly for Poland, the group of European states. The European Union itself acceded to the treaty as an organisation in 2012, following the entry into force of the third protocol allowing the accession of regional groupings, after France had done so earlier. Among the EU member states, Poland is only now joining the treaty—and at the same time as Sweden, Romania, and Lithuania, thus in a group led by Central and Northern European countries with security perspectives similar to all. 

The significance of the TAC is easier to grasp if we remember that Poland is not starting its relations with Southeast Asia from scratch. Its historical background is uneven, but real. During the Cold War, Warsaw was present primarily in Indochina: from 1954, it sat—alongside Canada and India—on the International Control Commissions overseeing the Geneva Agreements in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. It was a limited but recognisable presence: diplomatic, institutional, and symbolic at once. 

Joining the TAC alone won’t establish Poland’s position in Southeast Asia and may also be the case for others. However, it can structure it and provide a common framework if it builds on bilateral relations that already exist or have clear development potential. Alongside Vietnam and the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore remain practical channels for utilising the treaty. Indonesia combines the potential of the region’s largest economy with the political weight of a co-founding member state. Malaysia offers access to industrial and trade cooperation, and Singapore serves as a financial, logistical, and technological centre. These relationships demonstrate where accession to the TAC can gain practical meaning: in economic diplomacy, technology, logistics, energy, and sectoral cooperation projects. 

The accession to the TAC does not occur in a vacuum. It is part of a broader European shift towards the Indo-Pacific, which, with each passing year, is becoming less of a strategic slogan and more of an economic necessity. In 2020, EU-ASEAN relations were elevated to the status of a strategic partnership, and ASEAN is now, after China and the United States, the EU's third-largest non-European trading partner, with a trade in goods of around €275 billion. 

The region's importance, however, does not end with trade. ASEAN functions as a system of managed inconsistency: it maintains over twenty dialogue mechanisms encompassing all major powers and more often stabilizes the balance between them than formulates a unified policy line. For Europe, the region's stability translates directly into economic security, as a significant portion of global trade passes through its sea lanes—the Strait of Malacca alone accounts for approximately a quarter of seaborne trade. Subsequent initiatives confirm this dynamic: in September 2025, the EU and Indonesia finalized negotiations on a comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, opening a market of 280 million consumers. 

The European Union remains primarily an economic actor in Southeast Asia with limited political and military projection capabilities, which creates a structural asymmetry in its influence vis-à-vis Washington and Beijing. This diagnosis leads to the recommendation that countries prioritise not simply “being present in Asia,” but rather building a specialized position in selected segments—from maritime security and cybersecurity, through logistics, to energy transition and critical technologies. In other words, a shift from a declarative presence to a selective, sectoral, and strategically focused one is necessary. 

The TAC is important not only for the new entrants. For ASEAN itself, each subsequent accession by a foreign country—especially an EU and NATO member—confirms that the “ASEAN path” continues to attract partners from outside the region. At a time when the Association's consensual model is being tested by the US-China rivalry and the dispute over the South China Sea, expanding the circle of parties to the treaty strengthens its legitimacy as a regional code of conduct and architecture for dialogue. ---INFA

(Copyright, India News & Feature Alliance)

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